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The classical Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model explains tax
evasion behavior based on the probability of being discovered,
the amount of the fine imposed and the level of risk aversion.
Nonetheless, empirical studies show that the decision and the
level of tax evasion depends also on non economic considerations,
usually named as the "psychological costs" associated to tax
evasion. We build a theoretical model of tax evasion including
non monetary considerations. We propose an empirical study on the
determinants of the psychological costs of tax evasion, based on
the theoretical taxonomy proposed by Lagares (1994). Data come
from a questionnaire filled by 781 university students. The
dependent variable is the percentage of students considering
acceptable to evade taxes. Using a binomial logit model we find
that the justification of tax evasion is statistically related
with: the presence of grievance in absolute terms (those who feel
that taxes are too high; waste of public funds) and grievances in
relative terms (the suspected level of tax evasion by others,
those accepting black economy labor). The sense of duty and the

















The  classical  Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki  model  explains  tax  evasion  behavior  based  on  the
probability of being discovered, the amount of the fine imposed and the level of risk aversion.
Nonetheless, empirical studies show that the decision and the level of tax evasion depends also on
non economic considerations, usually named as the "psychological costs" associated to tax evasion.
We build a theoretical model of tax evasion including non monetary considerations. We propose an
empirical  study  on  the  determinants  of  the  psychological  costs  of  tax  evasion,  based  on  the
theoretical taxonomy proposed by Lagares (1994). Data come from a questionnaire filled by 781
university students. The dependent variable is the percentage of students considering acceptable to
evade  taxes.  Using  a  binomial  logit  model  we  find  that  the  justification  of  tax  evasion  is
statistically related with: the presence of grievance in absolute terms (those who feel that taxes are
too high; waste of public funds) and grievances in relative terms (the suspected level of tax evasion
by others, those accepting black economy labor). The sense of duty and the level of solidarity are
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Alligham and Sandmo (1972), Srinivasan (1973) and Yitzhaki (1974) propose the seminal
theoretical  models  aiming  to  identify  the  determinants  of  tax  evasion  behavior.  They
explain tax evasion behavior based on the probability of being audited, the amount of the
penalty imposed and the level of risk aversion. The relationship between tax evasion and
income or marginal tax rate is ambiguous according to these models.
These theoretical models have opened the door in the following decade to the first empirical
studies. The empirical results tend to confirm the influence of the variables as expected in
the theoretical models. It seems also to exist a positive relationship between tax rate and tax
evasion, in contrast with the ambiguous predictions of the model. Another conclusion that
has emerged from the early empirical tests is that when taking into account only the strict
economic determinants of tax evasion as proposed  by  the  seminal  models,  these  solely
variables are unable to explain a substantial share of effective tax compliance (Graetz and
Wilde, 1985; Skinner and Slemrod, 1985). Furthermore, counting only with strict economic
determinants produces an uncomfortable impossibility to explain the behavior of those who
never cheat (Baldry, 1986).
The first evident step in improving the explanatory model is to introduce socioeconomic
and demographic characteristics as controls. Even if this is an evident step, it has not been
always  possible  to  proceed  in  that  way  because  of  data  setting:  the  richest  data  set
concerning tax evasion behavior (the U.S. Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program)
does  not  provide  socioeconomic  information  of  individuals.  In  most  of  the  cases  these
variables are introduced as mere check of robustness of the other main finding proposed by
authors, without proposing a theoretic or psychological explanation to interpret the results.
It appears that among these characteristics, gender do matter for tax compliance, as female
tend to evade less than males; married people tend to evade less that single people, and age
tends to be positively correlated with compliance. There is no clear and consistent relation
between compliance and level of education, as the studies provide heterogeneous results on
this point. A similar ambiguous relation appears concerning the influence of unemployment
rate.  Andreoni,  Erard  and  Feinstein  (1998)  or  Bordignon  (1993)  propose  a  substantive
review of the literature concerning the empirical findings on tax evasion determinants.2
Similarly  to  what  has  happened  in  other  economic  research  agenda,  empirical  studies
concerning  tax  evasion  analysis  have  been  enriched  since  the  decade  of  the  1990  by
including strict non economic factors. The starting point for this new way of research is the
disconcerting  phenomenon  raised  by  Baldry  (1986):  there  is  a  significant  share  of
population who never cheat, even when the pure economic cost-benefit analysis is clearly
favorable  to  tax  evasion  behavior.  The  only  way  to  reconcile  this  result  with  the
preservation of the Allingham and Sadmo (1972) reference model is to postulate extreme
values of economic risk aversion for a significant share of the population.
As it does not always make sense to propose extreme practical assumptions in order to
match real life results with theoretical predictions, the second approach to resume the gap
between theory and reality is to enrich the theoretical model with additional explanatory
forces. In the tax evasion case it corresponds to the inclusion in the model of a psychic cost
associated to an eventual cheating attitude.
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We propose as reference a tax evasion model similar to that proposed by Allingham and
Sadmo (1972), because it has been used as starting point for subsequent models. We will
depart from it by including two new elements in the utility function in order to take into
account the effects of non economic considerations.
The original baseline Allingham and Sadmo (AS)  model  refers  to  a  calculus  about  the
decision about whether or not to evade under uncertainty. The potential evader has a level
of income < legally submitted to taxes, which is only know by him. He considers to only
declare an amount ;, minor than <. If the tax rate is W and he is not discovered, he will save
an income equal to W<; This decision is made under uncertainty, as there is a probability
S to be audited and the tax evasion be thus discovered. In this case, the evader will have to
pay the undeclared amount <;, at a penalty rate  which is higher than the tax rate W. The
potential evader tries thus to maximize the following expected utility function restricted to
the potential evaded income.3
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Our proposal is to modify the AS model in order to take into account strict non economic
considerations that a taxpayer can take into account before deciding to cheat or not, and to
which level. To be honest with Allingham and Sandmo (1972) original contribution, it has
to  be  stated  that  the  authors  considered  also  an  alternative  model  which  included  a
"reputation factor" affecting the utility function. This point is usually not reproduced in the
subsequent literature citing this paper.  "This is  very simple theory, and it may perhaps be
criticized for giving too little attention to non pecuniary factors in the taxpayer’s decision on
whether or not to evade taxes. It need hardly be stressed that in addition to the income loss
there may be other factors affecting utility if one’s attempt at tax evasion is detected. These
factors may perhaps be summarily characterized as affecting adversely one’s reputation as a
citizen of the community" (Allingham and Sadmo 1972, p. 326). Nevertheless, the authors
use  the  simplified  version  of  their  model  in  order  to  extract  their  main  theoretical
propositions.
The “reputation factor”  was  incorporated  in  the  AS  model  in  an  analogous  way as  we
propose with the last term of the expression 2, the factor  .
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Compared  with  expression  [1],  we  have  decomposed  in  expression  [2]  total  income
between  net  income  and  payment  to  tax  administration.  Factor    corresponds  to  the
disutility  generated  by  the  reputation  loss  produced  because  the  tax  evader  has  been
discovered  by  tax  administration.  It  is  estimated  H[ DQWH  by  the  potential  evader  and
incorporated into the maximization rule.
It can be noticed that expression 2 differs from expression 1 also by the element  , which is
present in both terms of the expression.   refers to the part of the psychic cost more directly
linked to what authors identify as “tax morale”. Some people consider that tax evasion can
never be ethically justified. Thus, depending on how strong this feeling is, it will lower the
direct utility produced by the consumption of the saved income by cheating. Our model
captures the notion of “crime and punishment” used in this and other related economics4
fields. If an individual considers that tax evasion is an unregular behavior SHUVH, when he
evaluates the possibility to cheat, such an action would put him in contradiction with his
personal beliefs. He considers then tax evasion as a “crime”. The eventuality of having
earned an illegal source of income should produce a personal feeling of “punishment”, a
sense of guilty, which is unrelated with the fact of being caught or not, and that he is able to
anticipate when assessing the utility of underreporting his income to the tax administration.
In this framework, the consumption of an illegally earned unit of income produces less
utility than the other part of the income legally obtained (  is thus lower than 1). In some
cases, the ethical repulsion to unduly earned income could be so strong that he anticipates a
null utility from the consumption of this illegal income (  is zero).
Our  model  includes  thus  the  non  economic  notions  of  guilt  (tax  morale)  and  shame
(reputation effect) proposed among others by Erard and Feinstein (1994)
2.
We derive the first order condition of expression 2 in expression 3
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From  expression  2  and  3  we  can  calculate  also  which  are  the  equilibrium  conditions
associated to a full tax compliance, where the quantity declared for tax purposes correspond
to the actual personal wealth: ; <.
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Expression 4 can be rewritten as
                                                
2  The  functional  relationship  between  moral  sentiments  and  the  level  of  utility  produced  evaded  income
proposed by Erard and Feinstein (1994) is made proportionally dependent to the ratio of his underpayment to
his true income. They consider also that the disutility factor affect all their income, also that honestly earned,
point that is somewhat surprising. These authors consider also that tax morale considerations are not present
under the audited event. Finally, the simplified functional form proposed  in  our  paper  helps  to  perfectly
capture the behavior of those never considering to evade, whatever the strictly economic costs and benefits
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Let us denote the part of the expression 5 in brackets as  .
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If we rewrite expression 5 using expression 6, we have:
ha p W S < [7]
Expression 5 provides us the information about the minimal conditions in terms of marginal
benefits associated to tax evasion (right side of the inequality) needed to undermine the
expected  costs  of  tax  evasion  behavior  (left  side  of  the  inequality)  and  thus  making
reasonably to begin to underreport income, in terms of personal utility.
We can identify several reference points by giving specific values to the factors   and 
which are interesting for our purposes.
We consider 4 different states related with the presence of non pecuniary factors in the
utility function of a potential tax evader.
In  the  first  case  we  eliminate  all  references  to  non  pecuniary  considerations  in  the
maximization exercise. This happens when   is 1 (total absence of tax morale) and   is zero
(agent  does  not  care  about  reputation  if  caught  cheating).  In  this  case,  expression  7  is
reduced to the expression 8, as a takes value 1.
W S < p [8]
The  tax  payer  will  fill  correctly  his  tax  duties  as  far  as  the  expected  tax  payment  on
undeclared  income  (S )  is  at  less  equal  to  the  regular  income  (W).  He  will  begin  to
underreport when the inequality 8 holds.6
The regular tax rate acts as the marginal benefit of one unit of income evaded, which has to
be checked against the marginal cost, determined by the probability of being audited times
the penalty. This result corresponds logically to the basic finding obtained from the AS
baseline model.
We can now analyze what happens to the decision rule when the non economic elements
are active.
The second case under consideration correspond to the individual who has not really strictly
ethical concerns when assessing the tax evasion convenience (  remains equal to one), but
he  gives  importance  to  his  personal  reputation,  for  a  number  of  reasons  ( >0).  If 
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This results is similar to the alternative AS model which included the "reputation factor".
Assuming as usual that the marginal utility of income is decreasing we conclude that   is
less than one. This result implies that when taking into consideration the reputation factor
among the elements affecting the utility function of a potential tax evader, the threshold of
tolerance  to  cheating  behavior  is  reduced,  all  other  things  being  equal.  Effectively,  the
marginal benefit associated to tax evasion is reduced, as W W. So, if the values of S and 
remains unchanged, the segment of income for which there is a net benefit to try to hide to
tax administration is reduced. Note also that this reduction of the window favorable to tax
evasion supposes a jump reduction compared with situation depicted in the expression 8, as
 is  strictly  greater  than  zero.  We  have  supposed  in  our  model  that  the  shame  effect
produced  by  the  loss  of  reputation  is  independent  from  the  amount  of  income
underreported, as the reputation loss emerges when an audit proofs that the taxpayer has not
fully filled his legal obligations.
The third case takes into account the presence of "tax morale" principles and sentiments to
some extent in the individual considering the eventuality of cheating. In this case,   is7
strictly smaller than one, but also strictly greater than zero (0<  <1). If the agent is sensitive
to tax morale concerns, we also suppose that she will also take care about her reputation
( >0).
Under these circumstances, the equilibrium conditions are those already presented under the
expression 6.
ha p W S < [10]
As   is positive but smaller than one, we have that the marginal benefit associated to tax
evasion when taking into account tax morale and reputation factors is lower than those
guided only by reputation factors.  W W W < < a ha . By this the space where tax evasion yields
net utility to a potential tax evader is still reduced.
Finally,  we  can  consider  the  fourth  reference  case,  where  tax  morale  concerns  are
completely dominant (  =0). This means as already stated that the additional consumption
generated by tax underreporting does not produce any increment of utility at all, as the
punishment feeling overrides completely the satisfaction of additional revenues.
In this case, expression 6 becomes:
0 < p S [11]
As  the  penalty  associated  to  tax  evasion  ( )  and  the  audit  probability  (S)  are  strictly
positive, there is no compatible tax evasion threshold under fully tax morale assumption.
Even if the probability of being caught was null, there is no place for a cheating behavior
under full tax morale beliefs, as the entering into the cheating territory needs a negative
value for S ., solution which is non real world feasible. An economic agent as depicted
under this fourth case will never find economic motivations able to counterbalance her tax
morale beliefs in order to lead her into the tax evasion territory.
The model proposed in this paper offers a theoretical sustentation to a number of empirical
puzzles and findings concerning the determinants of tax evasion behavior or, conversely, of
tax compliance. This model allows to understand the actually substantive share of taxpayers
who had never evaded and who do not plan to evade in the future, independently of their8
revenues, the fiscal burden they support and their possibilities to easily underreport income
with low or even insignificant chances of being caught.
The model also captures the behavior of those agents who refrain their interest of cheating
when considering only economic arguments because they take into account the effects of
such  a  behavior  on  their  tax  morale  feelings  and/or  on  their  reputation.  Nevertheless,
individuals in this group can enter into the tax evasion territory if the difference between the
economic benefits and costs is higher than the anticipated psychic costs.
Finally, there is a third group of individuals who only take into account the probability of
audit and the penalty supported if caught against the potential benefit generated by the
underreported income in order to decide whether or not to hide all or a share of their taxable
income  to  the  tax  administration.  This  last  group  of  individuals  use  to  concentrate  the
attention of researchers on tax evasion behavior.
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Andreoni  HW DO  (1998)  consider  that  a  lot  of  new  pieces  of  information  concerning  tax
evasion  behavior  have  been  improved  thanks  to  new  empirical  results,  but  they  are
sometimes somehow difficult to interpret because their lack of linkage with comprehensive
theoretical models.
Our intention is to move further into the comprehension of psychic costs effects on tax
compliance, using the reference model proposed in the preceding section.
In  the  theoretical  model  derived  in  the  precedent  section  we  have  shown  the  possible
presence of two different origin of non economic determinants affecting the decision to
evade  or  not  and  to  what  extent.  In  this  section  we  will  focus  our  attention  mainly  in
behavior linked with tax morale notion ( ).
Nevertheless, and referring for a moment to the other element identified in the model (the
reputation factor  ) as conceptually different from the tax morale arguments can help us to
offer an explanation to one empirical finding in this field, which is normally presented9
without interpretation. Some empirical studies (Hanousek and Palda 2003, Flathmann and
Shreffin  2002,  Torgler  2002)  show  that  gender  do  matter  for  tax  compliance  attitudes
(females are less tolerant to cheating behavior than males) as well as age (old people tend to
justify less tax evasion than young people). This differential behavior is attributed normally
to  structural  differences  in  tax  morale,  even  if  it  is  difficult  to  find  sociological  or
psychological intuitions justifying such gender and age differences. We have identified in
the precedent section a second group of agents which are sensible to the reputation factor
and some of them also to tax morale concerns, but not to a so stringent level that they all
renounce to cheat in any case. Under this group some of them can reject tax evasion only
because of the reputation factor, which is not part of the tax morale components, strictly
speaking.  To  this  group,  the  subjective  perception  of  the  probabilities  of  being  caught
cheating is determinant for the decision to evade or not. This perception is determined by
objective information captured by each potential tax evader, but also and in a significant
manner by the level of risk aversion. And there is some empirical evidence suggestion that
female and aged people tend to be more risk averse than the complementary groups.
Even if several authors working in this field consider that empirical research on tax morale
is in its childhood (Andreoni et al 1998; Torgler 2003b), substantial advances have been
reached since the late eighties. We will reunite this several pieces in the model we propose
in this paper. We use Lagares (1994) systematic regrouping of arguments concerning tax
morale motivations as reference point.
Expression 11 shows the list of tax morale determinants we will consider in this section.
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Remember that higher values of   correspond to lower levels of tax morale10









￿ ] ] - - a a ,..., 1 ) personal biography on tax evasion activities. ] is thus defined as <;.
Assuming that  <1 we reflect the decreasing impact of past actions in present beliefs. We
argue thus that present and past tax evasion behavior does affect the present. This same
argument is clearly stated by Andreoni HWDO (1998) "Individuals seek to present a rational,
coherent image in surveys: those who report engaging in evasion provide beliefs to justify
their evasion, while those who report that they are honest provide beliefs to justify their
honesty" (Andreoni et al 1998, p. 845).
The attempt to adjust personal behavior to personal beliefs but also the human tendency to
revise  and  adapt  personal  beliefs  because  of  actual  behavior  seems  to  be  a  basic  and
profound psychological pattern, sculpted by the classical motto attributed to several authors:
"behave  as  you  think,  or  you  will  end  by  thinking  as  you  behave".  We  no  dot  have
arguments to exclude its presence in tax morale evaluation.
This means that we are faced to a strong problem of endogeneity: tax morale is expected to
influence the level of tax compliance, but at the same time present and past records of tax
compliance affects tax morale.
Interestingly, we expect that the endogeneity problem is somehow asymmetric, depending
on the occurrence of tax evasion behavior. If a taxpayer has never cheated before, we can
assume  that  the  endogeneity  problem  is  mainly  diluted,  as  the  correlation  becomes  a
causality sense from tax morale beliefs to the absence of tax evasion behavior. Even in this
case  we  cannot  exclude  a  weak  reversal  relation,  as  tax  compliance  behavior  helps  to
reinforce  the  conviction  that  tax  evasion  is  never  justifiable.  In  the  opposite  case,  if  a
taxpayer has evaded at least once, we can expect strong forces mutually reinforcing the
correlation between both variables: tax evasion is accepted and executed because the lack of
strong tax morale restrains and at the same time the repetition of illegal cheating behavior
weakens  the  internal  tax  morale  arguments,  as  the  agent  search  to  justify  his  practical
decisions.11
This  insidious  interaction  between  tax  morale  and  tax  evasion  poses  severe  structural
problems of robustness of the results produced by empirical analysis where the level of tax
morale is included among the explanatory variables of tax compliance. Hanousek and Palda
(2003) propose an empirical estimation where they interact these two variables. The main
contribution of Flathmann and Shreffin (2003) when adding tax morale arguments into an
empirical test of tax compliance is precisely that respondents tend to significantly under
acknowledge their tax evasion practices.
More  distorting,  these  difficulties  continue  to  appear  even  in  empirical  attempts  to
understand  tax  morale  determinants,  as  the  values  of  the  dependent  and  independent
variables will be polluted by the presence or absence of actual tax evasion practices among
the  individuals  of  the  sample.  Our  empirical  design  is  oriented  mainly  to  override  this
problem.
The second argument included in the explanatory model of tax morale is DJ, which refers to
grievance in absolute terms. This attitude appears when a taxpayer is contrary to significant
features of the functioning of the public sector activities in fields sensitive to tax duties: this
may be produced because she considers that public expenditures are too high, that they are
oriented to meaningless policies or that a share of public income is wasted or diverted
because of civil servants’ corruption. Another similar argument related to this point is the
consideration that the quantity and quality of public services enjoyed are not in due rapport
with  the  fiscal  burden  supported.  This  "fairness"  argument  constitutes  the  nerve  of  the
theoretical  model  on  tax  evasion  proposed  by  Bordignon  (1993).  We  can  find  other
contributions  supporting  the  incidence  of  this  grievance  in  absolute  terms  (Cowell  and
Gordon,  1988;  Falkinger,  1988;  Webley  HW DO,  1991;  Smith,  1992;  Pommerehene  HW DO,
1994). The higher the sentiment of grievance in absolute terms, the lower the tax morale
belief  and  thus,  the  higher  the  level  of  tax  evasion.  Torgler  (2002)  finds  a  statistically
significant influence of this element on tax morale when using trust in government as proxy
for grievance in absolute terms.
The third element intervening in the tax morale function is the term UJ, the grievance in
relative terms. This sentiment is produced when an individual considers that the tax burden12
actually  supported  is  excessive  given  his  personal  socioeconomic  characteristics.  This
sentiment can also appear when a taxpayer observes or thinks that other taxpayers in a
similar economic situation are paying a lower amount of taxes than him, in a regular way or
by  cheating.  The  presence  of  this  sentiment  will  lower  the  influence  of  tax  morale
considerations when deciding whether or not to evade (suspected level of. tax evasion in
general  or  in  the  same  branch  of  activity).  Spice  and  Hero  (1985),  Porcano  (1988),  or
Gordon (1989) propose analysis oriented to this argument. Flathmann and Shreffin (2003),
Hanousek and Palda (2003) find that this argument does affect tax evasion behavior.
The two remaining terms of the tax morale function are similar but not synonyms. The first
one (G) refers to the ethical sense of duty and the second (V), to the sense of solidarity. In
both cases, and for a wide variety of motivations, people can abstain evading taxes simply
because of the presence of strong beliefs of moral, legal or social duty and/or the sentiment
of solidarity with the well being of others. The higher the value of G and V, the higher the
level  of  tax  morale  (the  lower  the  value  of  ).  In  some  cases,  this  may  be  the  basic
component of a high tax morale standard. Based in his empirical results, Pyles affirm that
such a behavior is by far non marginal: "It seems that whilst the odds are heavily in favor of
evaders getting away with it, the vast majority of taxpayers behave honestly" (Pyle 1991, p.
173). Roth, Scholtz and Witte (1989), Grasmick and Bursick (1990), Scholz and Pinney
(1993), Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) count amount the contributions having stressed this
point.
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We present in this section the structure we have chosen in order to empirically test which
are the determinants of tax morale, according to the functional relationship shown in the
precedent section.
Some measures of tax morale have been proposed in the literature. We have also shown in
the precedent section that several empirical estimations have included specific variables13
corresponding to some of the components of the tax morale function. In both cases, they
have been used to test their impact on the level of tax compliance.
To our knowledge, there is almost no empirical literature dealing with explanatory models
of tax morale. One exception is Benno Torgler, who has extensively worked in this specific
area (see for instance Torgler 2001; 2002, 2003a; 2003b).
The starting critical point is the identification of the dependent variable, the measure of tax
morale. The basic feature is to create a framework where the eventual impact of tax morale
can  be  encapsulated  and  cleaned  from  other  variables  susceptible  to  also  affect  tax
compliance. Expression 5 provides the more general set of variables having a theoretical
impact on the agent’s decision about tax evasion. The probability of being audited (S) and
the penalty suffered if a tax evader is caught ( ) are variable mostly driven by economic
considerations. We would like thus to eliminate their influence. This result can be attained
when the probability of being caught cheating is virtually null. Thus, if S@0, expression 7
becomes:
ha p W S < @ 0 [14]
In  this  case  the  expected  economic  costs  associated  with  tax  evasion  are  virtually  null
(S @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the agent considering to evade taxes is faced to a strict positive value of the tax rate (t>0).
In  this  setting,  the  only  way  to  explain  why  an  agent  renounces  to  adopt  tax  evasion
practices is that she assumes full tax morale principles ( =0). This is the framework we are
interested in. Torgler (2002) correctly selects the tax morale variable, even if the question
used to identify it contains some ambiguity concerning the crucial point of probability of
being audited. He uses the following question from the World Value Survey: "Please tell
me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never
be justified, or something in between: (...) Cheating on tax if you have the chance".
It has also to be decided which empirical method is used. Tax compliance empirical studies
have profusely used audit data, as this is the most reliable data set. When looking to more
specific motivations about tax compliance linked to tax morale determinants, audit data or14
tax amnesty data are useless as these evasive notions are never taken into account in these
data sets. Researchers must turn to laboratory experiments or survey data methodology in
order to deal with tax morale determinants. The usual shortcomings attributed to laboratory
experiments apply also here. Concerning survey data, the main advantages disadvantages of
this approach, as Andreoni et al (1998) state, are that they include "attitudinal variables that
are not available with tax return and audit data, allowing researches to investigate a rich set
of hypotheses about the factors associated with non compliance. The major disadvantage of
survey  data  is  that  they  are  based  on  self-reports,  which  often  provide  very  inaccurate
information" (Andreoni HWDO, 1998, p. 837).
We have selected the survey data approach, using a sample of university students. Non
representative  sample  selection  raise  always  doubts  and  critics  about  the  possible
extrapolation of the results. Ironic authors use to comment that all that studies do not learn
us how do people behave, but how  students  behave,  and  normally  just  Economics  and
Management students. We will show now that our preference for such a data set selection
and methodology is probably the less inconvenient when trying to tackle specifically tax
morale determinants. Our intention is to provide empirical coefficients to the variables that
we suppose affect tax morale, according to the functional relation of expressions 12 and 13.
As we presented the expected impact of each explanatory variable we have raised the issue
of the acute problems concerning the relationship between tax morale and present and past
tax compliance, which could potentially undermine the robustness of empirical results.
Our strategy is to propose a sample selection where the impact of tax evasion behavior is
minimized.  Of  course  we  suffer  from  sample  selection  problems  if  we  restricted  the
analysis to a group of tax evaders or a group of full compliance taxpayers. But by selecting
a set of university students we reduce the problem to the best way we think we can. College
students (our sample refers to undergraduate students) have no experience of direct tax
payment, at least in Spain, as virtually any student pursue studies and work experience to
the extent that earned income becomes taxable. If they do not have to pay taxes, they have
not  evaded  taxes,  and  they  had  never  really  decided  whether  or  not  to  evade  taxes  in





,..., 1 , 0 , 0 = " = - a [15]
Expression 12 is thus simplified to the following arguments, which we want to estimate
) , , , ( V G UJ DJ I = h [16]
The elimination of individuals with tax evasion practices increase the reliability of each
student’s answer about whether or not they consider that cheating is acceptable.
The students sample selection has also another indirect advantage, which is also important.
This selection helps to inoculate the interaction between tax morale and effective tax rate,
as shown in expression 13. Even if we propose a framework where S is null, different risk
aversion could make nevertheless  that  the  perception  of  probability  of  being  audited  is
something greater than zero. In this case, a full compliance behavior could be driven also by
a tax morale standard which is not maximal coupled with a low tax rate which makes
uninteresting tax evasion.
A way to reduce this source of distortion is to fix the value of the tax rate to a given level
identical for all individuals of the sample ( W W = ), but without fixing all the other relevant
characteristics of the individuals. We argue that this tends to happen in the sample we have
chosen. Effectively, students are not faced to effective tax rates when considering whether
tax evasion is justifiable or not. If any anticipation, students are thinking that they will earn
in  the  future  higher  than  average  income,  as  they  all  are  engaged  in  a  human  capital
investment that should in average produce positive returns. They will then expect to support
in the future a significant tax rate, that they can just roughly evaluate as higher than average,
without knowing how much is it.
The homogeneity in the sample selection has also the advantage that allows to obviate
socioeconomic  and  demographic  control  factors  like  age  and  education,  as  they  are
practically the same for all of them.
7KH'DWD6HWDQGWKH(PSLULFDO5HVXOWV16
The  date  set  was  constructed  through  a  questionnaire  distributed  to  781  undergraduate
students  from  the  University  of  Navarra  of  13  different  groups  from  two  schools:
Economics and Business Administration and Communication. The final sample consist in
617  observations,  after  dropping  those  not  fully  answered.  It  was  anonymous  and
confidential  and  filled  in  the  classrooms.  Another  preliminary  remark  written  in  the
questionnaire and repeated orally was: "It’s essential that when you are asked about your
position on different issues to give your opinion completely frankly (remember that this
questionnaire is completely anonymous). In last resort, it is better not to answer a specific
question if you are not comfortably with the answer you have in mind".
The questionnaire consisted in three groups of questions. We asked first which was their
personal position concerning a variety of issues (29 questions) with only a possible yes/no
answer;  then  we  asked  them  to  guess  which  percentage  of  people  did  they  think  were
favorable to some (20) of the 29 issues raised before, independently of what their personal
position  was.  Finally,  we  asked  them  to  say  how  much  embarrassed  they  would  be  if
discovered doing or being favorable to some (20) of the 29 issues, in a scale 1-5.
The questionnaire asked intentionally for a wide variety of social, political and economic
issues (see questionnaire in annex). The dependent variable of our model are questions
number 13 and 14 referred to tax evasion justification: "Do you think it is justifiable to
cheat  the  tax  administration  (to  pay  less  taxes  than  due)?"  (Q13).  "Do  you  think  it  is
justifiable to cheat the tax administration (to pay less taxes than due) if besides there are
small chances of being discovered cheating?" (Q14). 36.14% of total respondents consider
that tax evasion is justifiable according to Q13 wording. This percentage rises to 41.21% if
we refer to Q14. These numbers are in line with other surveys referring to the Spanish case.
According to the World Values Survey conducted in 1990 and reported by Torgler (2002) it
indicates that in Spain 41.6% of the 3745 respondents consider that tax evasion can be
justified. According to IEF (2002), 36% of the respondents consider that tax evasion can be
justified. The IEF sample corresponds to 1506 persons interviewed.
We have chosen the following explanatory variables of tax morale. To test for the presence
of grievance in absolute terms (DJ) we have chosen variables referred to tax burden, 7RR7D[17
(Do you think that taxes paid in Spain are too high?, question A8), if they are favorable to
the suppression of Inheritance Tax (,QKHULW7D[) question A15. Another question refers to
the perceived efficiency and responsibility of civil servants (Do you think that in general the
State waste and squander taxpayers money?, :DVWH, question A 25). Finally, question A28
deals with the acceptance of underground firms which do not pay social benefits to their
workers in order to survive (8QGHUJURXQG).
Concerning grievance in relative terms (UJ) we have included the answer concerning the
percentage of people they think are justifying tax evasion, as a proxy for the estimation of
the level of tax evasion (2WKHUV(YDVLRQ), question B13. The second variable refers to the
perceived fairness of tax pressure supported by famous and rich people (5LFK, question A
26).
To test of the influence of the sense of duty (G) we have included four variables regarding
four practices going against legal or social rules. )UHH%HHU corresponds to acknowledging
that the respondent has taken something in a bar without paying for it during the last six
months,  question  A7.  The  second  question  (A24)  asks  about  the  acceptance  of  buying
illegal CD music in the street (&'). The third one refers to the acceptance of the non-
respect of legal road speed limits (6SHHG, question A 23). The last variable of this group
checks the acceptance of voting absenteeism in general elections (9RWLQJ, question A 22).
As for the solidarity factor (V) we asked if they have given more than one euro to someone
in need or an NGO since the beginning of the year (1*2), question A12. We include
variables referred to the acceptance of public expenditures, asking if they were favorable to
substantial increases in public financed aid to developing countries ($LG([S), question A16.
Question A19 refers to their willingness to reduce existing 8QHPSOR\PHQW%HQHILWV in order
to increase job supply. The last variable in this group concerns the disposability to offer one
hour per day to solve colleagues’ academic doubts ('RXEWV, question A27).
As  control  for  the  presence  of  the  risk  aversion  profile  affecting  the  perception  of  the
probability of being caught we have introduced a question concerning their willingness to
bet 5 Euros with 50% of probabilities of winning another 5 Euros and 50% of losing them.
(5LVN, question A29).18
Finally,  we  have  considered  some  socio-economic  control  variables,  like  *HQGHU,  the
expected amount of future income (([S,QFRPH), estimated just as much higher, higher,
average or lower in comparison with national average income. A third variable refers to the
parental level of education (holders of an university degree), 3DUHQWV(GX. We also control
for  the  studies  they  are  pursuing,  )&RP.  We  also  compare  the  behavior  of  first  year
students ()UHVKPHQ) related to final year students
We have run a Binary Logit regression by maximum likelihood. Results are summarized in
table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
We have run two reference models, identical in their explanatory variables, but using as
dependent  variable  the  two  different  wordings  of  the  question  concerning  tax  evasion
justification.  Remember  that  Q14  adds  to  Q13  the  case  where  the  probability  of  being
caught cheating is null. If respondents where perfectly coherent, the answers to question
Q13 and Q14 should be identical, as as we have shown in the theoretical part of the paper,
tax morale (the opposite of tax avoidance justification) is independent of the costs and
benefits of actual tax evasion. Probability of being caught cheating is part of the costs of tax
evasion decision, but not of tax morale determinants. The actual difference between Q13
and Q14 in our sample suggest that the plain question Q13 ("Do you think it is justifiable to
cheat the tax administration (to pay less taxes than due)?") overestimate the level of tax
morale, which is better caught by Q14. We present the results of both regressions.
The empirical results suggest that a main factors leading respondents to internally justify
tax evasion behavior are linked with the presence of grievance in absolute and relative
terms. It appears that the personal sense of duty and solidarity does also have an effect on
the level of tax avoidance acceptance, but only marginally, at least when compared to the
influence of grievance factors.
All  absolute  grievance  variables  excepting  the  variable  referred  to  the  abolition  of
inheritance  tax  (,QKHULW7D[)  are  statistically  significant,  and  all  with  the  expected  sign.
Those that consider that tax pressure (7RR7D[) is too high in Spain tend to clearly justify tax19
evasion in a higher extent than others. The same occurs to those that consider that the
public sector do not manage tax money in an effective and sober way (:DVWH). Those that
justify the existence of firms that are not able to pay the social security duties of their
workers do also justify tax evasion (8QGHUJURXQG).
Concerning the grievance in relative terms, the perceived level of tax evasion acceptance by
others (2WKHUV(YDVLRQ) strongly influences the level of tax morale, in the expected way.
As mentioned, variables linked with the personal sense of duty and solidarity do not seem
to be essential to explain tax morale sensitivity, even if they behave all in the expected
sense of relation with the level of tax morale.
Concerning the variables measuring the sense of duty, we can observe that all of them are
statistically significant depending on the model, while only 9RWLQJ does it in both models.
Those who justify absenteeism do also justify tax evasion. A similar pattern of behavior
appear  with  those  acknowledging  having  not  paid  for  bar  consumption  ()UHH%HHU),
accepting to buy illegal CD (&') and non respecting car speed limits (6SHHG).
The variables related with the level of solidarity follow again all the expected sign: the
higher the esteem to solidarity actions and behavior, the lower the acceptance of tax evasion
rationale. But only the desire to increase Public Aid expenditures ($LG([S) is statistically
related with the level of tax morale.
The level of tax morale is affected by risk seeking profiles (5LVN) precisely under the model
2 where the probability of being caught cheating was supposed to be null (Q14)
Concerning control variables, the most interesting feature is to show the absence of any
relationship between gender and tax morale. This result is in contrast with many empirical
studies  showing  a  relationship  between  gender  and  actual  tax  evasion  behavior.  The
absence  of  this  relationship  in  an  H[ DQWH  context  as  ours  suggests  the  existence  of
endogeneity problems between variables in the framework of actual tax evasion behavior.
Our results suggest also the absence of influence of expected future personal income on tax
evasion justification. If any, this relationship appears to be negative: the higher the level of
future expected personal income, the lower the justification of tax evasion behavior. The20
higher the level of parent’s formal education the higher the level of tax morale (the lower
tax cheating justification), but not to a point to be statistically significant. The difference of
attitude concerning first year and last year students is not significant, while the Business
and Economics student tend to present lower tax morale standards than Communication
students.
&RQFOXGLQJUHPDUNV
The  theoretical  model  we  have  proposed  in  section  2  allows  us  to  understand  and  to
incorporate in classical models of tax evasion how it is possible that a significant share of
taxpayers  never  consider  to  cheat,  even  if  they  have  convincing  economic  benefits  if
following such a practice. Our key assumption is that individuals supporting tax morale
beliefs are not able to enjoy an income illegally obtained, at least to a full extent. We do
think  that  this  is  not  an  heroic  assumption  as  much  of  the  readers  of  this  paper  can
personally perceive this assumption as realistic.
With this theoretical result we can propose in section 3 a theoretical explanation of tax
morale  determinants.  These  two  steps  allows  us  to  proceed  to  an  empirical  test of  our
assumptions  hopefully  avoiding  the  criticism  raised  in  the  literature  that  much  of  the
empirical contributions on tax morale and tax compliance are not grounded in theoretical
models, which difficult the interpretation of the empirical results.
We have been conscious in selecting our data set in order to make it coherent with the
theoretical proposals. The empirical results are all in line with our predictions and with
other  precedents  results  of  the  literature,  but  presented  here  in  the  framework  of  a
comprehensive model and empirical test of tax morale.
The interest of understanding tax morale determinants does not probably finish in the pure
academic  sphere.  Policies  aiming  to  diminish  the  amount  of  tax  cheating  are  mostly
oriented to repressive schemes, addressed to increase the economic costs associated to tax
evasion  (control  and  penalties  strategies).  But  some  tax  administrations  do  also  spend
energies and resources combining repressive policies with preventive policies. Clearly, a21
strong tax evasion preventive instrument is to try to increase the level of taxpayers’ tax
morale.
Our empirical results suggest that much can be done in this sense with informative policies
when  the  public  opinion  have  misperceptions  concerning  the  quality  of  public  sector
outcomes and the level of tax system pressure. Otherwise, if bad public service quality
deserve the bad perception captured by public opinion, the only way to increase tax morale
standards is to foster public service quality.
Our results suggest also that the level of tax morale can be increased if the people learn that
only few taxpayers do not comply with their fiscal duties (if this is the case).  By contrast, it
will be difficult to reinforce the level of tax morale if a country do really suffer from a high
level of underground economy and the actual rate of tax evasion is high and notorious. In
this sense, repressive policies effectively combating tax evasion and underground economy
will produce as byproduct an increase of tax morale attitude of other potential taxpayers.
Campaigns  stressing  the  importance  of  the  sense  of  duty  and  solidarity  linked  to  the
fulfillment of personal tax duties can produce an increase of tax morale. Nevertheless, and
always  according  to  our  empirical  results,  those  efforts  will  be  less  rewarding  that
information and educational campaigns focussed in the diminution of the perceived level of
absolute and relative grievance.
All in all, and always according to our empirical results, preventive campaigns fighting tax
cheating acceptance will be more successful when being informative oriented regarding to




Dependent variable: Q13 Q14
(1) (2)
Coefficient Coefficient
Explanatory variables                                       (z-Statistic)                                            (z-Statistic)
*ULHYDQFH$EVROXWH




Waste 0.3753 * 0.4024 **
(1.933) (2.136)
Underground 0.8176 *** 0.7212 ***
(3.688) (3.300)
*ULHYDQFH5HODWLYH
ln(OthersEvasion) 1.4170 *** 1.3688 ***
(7.134) (7.392)
'XW\
FreeBeer 0.3916 * 0.1787
(1.667) (0.774)
CD 0.2005 0.4252 *
(0.814) (1.786)
Speed 0.3152 0.4470 *
(1.322) (1.917)





AidExp -0.1904 -0.3915 *
(-0.783) (-1.654)





Risk 0.1954 0.3217 *
(0.995) (1.689)
&RQVWDQW -6.1464 *** -6.0242 ***
(-6.140) (-6.369)
&RQWUROYDULDEOHV










McFadden R-squared 0.1947 0.1884
Log likelihood -336.43 -353.64
LR statistic 162.77 *** 164.15 ***23
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Annex
&XHVWLRQDULR
Le estamos muy sinceramente agradecidos por su colaboración al contestar a las preguntas que formulamos a
continuación.
$GYHUWHQFLDSUHYLD
Para que los datos de la encuesta puedan ser oportunamente tratados es esencial que las respuestas sean
llevadas a cabo de modo anónimo y confidencial.
0RGRGHUHOOHQDUHOFXHVWLRQDULR
Formularemos una serie de cuestiones sobre temas muy variados.
A. En cada caso le pediremos en primer lugar que tome posición con respecto al tema tratado (sí/no). Es
esencial que dé su opinión con total franqueza (recuerde que la encuesta es completamente anónima). En
último caso, es mejor no responder a una pregunta precisa si o está a gusto con dar la respuesta que tiene en
mente.
B. A continuación  le pediremos que indique cuál es el porcentaje de población que usted estima que está a
favor de cada cuestión. Entendemos que para la mayoría de los casos no tiene una idea clara sobre cuánta
gente piensa eso, pero le pedimos que nunca deje esa respuesta en blanco, e indique la cifra que le parece más
razonable. Puede dar su respuesta para intervalos de 5 puntos porcentuales (Es decir: 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%,
20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 45%, 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, 90%, 95%, 100%).
$WHQFLyQVHKDFRQVWDWDGRTXHODJHQWHVHGHMDLQIOXLUSRUORTXHXQRSLHQVDSHUVRQDOPHQWHVREUHHO
WHPDFXDQGRLQWHQWDDGLYLQDUHOSRUFHQWDMHGHJHQWHTXHSLHQVDORPLVPRVREUHHVHWHPD
C. Finalmente le pedimos que responda a las siguientes preguntas imaginando su reacción en las situaciones
que se describen a continuación.
3UHJXQWDV
1. Varón   Mujer 
2. Empadronado en Navarra   Fuera de Navarra 
3. ¿Tiene su padre y/o su madre formación universitaria?  Sí  No 
4. Imagine su situación familiar y profesional cinco años después de acabar su carrera. Usted supone que su
nivel de renta será:  Muy superior a la media española  Superior a la media  Como la
media     Inferior 
5. Al acabar la carrera le gustaría trabajar en el mundo de las finanzas (bancos, mercados financieros)
Más bien sí   Más bien no  No lo sé 
3UHJXQWDV$
Vt QR
1. ¿Estaría usted a favor de que las grandes superficies abran al público durante todo el domingo? 
2. ¿Tendría muchas dificultades en aceptar que una hermana se case con alguien de raza gitana?
3. ¿Ha leído usted un libro de literatura entero durante los últimos tres meses?27
4. ¿Se alegra usted cuando eliminan al Real Madrid de las competiciones europeas de fútbol?
5. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a aceptar que los automovilistas que quieran ir al el centro de Madrid deban pagar
un impuesto de 5 euros por día, para disminuir el tráfico y la contaminación?
6. ¿Suele echar la siesta durante los días laborables?
7. ¿Ha tomado una consumición en algún lugar público y se ha ido sin pagar en los últimos 6 meses?
8. ¿Cree que los impuestos que se pagan en España son excesivos?
9. ¿Ha tomado más de dos copas de licores fuertes durante una velada durante el último mes?
10. ¿Le gusta ver de vez en cuando el programa Gran Hermano?
11. ¿Ha ido al teatro alguna vez durante el último año?
12. ¿Ha hecho algún donativo superior a 1 euro a algún mendigo, ONG u organización caritativa desde el
principio de año?
13. ¿Le parece justificable engañar a Hacienda (pagar menos impuestos que lo que se debe)?
14. ¿Le parece justificable engañar a Hacienda (pagar menos impuestos que lo que se debe), si además hay
pocas posibilidades de ser descubierto?
15. ¿Está usted a favor de la eliminación del Impuesto de Sucesiones (no pagar impuestos por las herencias
recibidas)?
16. ¿Está usted a favor de que aumenten mucho los fondos públicos destinados a la cooperación al desarrollo
de los países necesitados?
17. ¿Cree usted que en general el proceso de globalización económica es algo positivo?
18. ¿Está usted a favor de que aumente mucho el gasto público dedicado a la defensa en España?
19. ¿Cree usted que habría que disminuir las prestaciones de desempleo para que los parados busquen trabajo
más seriamente?
20. ¿Está usted a favor de que la emigración sahariana y subsahariana siga llegando como mínimo al mismo
ritmo que ahora durante los próximos 10 años?
21. ¿Está usted a favor del ingreso de Turquía en la Unión Europea?
22. ¿Le parece aceptable que haya gente que no vaya a votar cuando hay elecciones generales porque no le
interesa?
23. ¿Le parece aceptable que en general los conductores no respeten los límites de velocidad en las carreteras?
24. ¿Le parece aceptable comprar CD piratas en la calle?
25. ¿Cree usted que en general el Estado malgasta y despilfarra el dinero que recibe de los contribuyentes?
26. ¿Cree usted que en general las personas famosas con altos ingresos consiguen pagar demasiado poco
impuestos?28
27. Si pudieras ayudarles, ¿estarías dispuesto a dedicar una hora cada día para resolver dudas a tus
compañeros de clase?
28. ¿Le parece bien que haya pequeñas empresas que para poder sobrevivir y contratar a gente no declare a
sus trabajadores y por lo tanto no pague sus cotizaciones sociales?




1. ¿Qué porcentaje de gente piensa usted que está a favor de que las grandes superficies abran al público todo
el domingo? _________
2. ¿Qué porcentaje de gente piensa usted que tendría muchas dificultades en aceptar que una hermana se case
con alguien de raza gitana? _________
3. ¿Qué porcentaje de gente piensa usted que en España ha leído un libro de literatura durante los últimos tres
meses? _________
4. ¿Qué porcentaje de gente piensa usted que se alegra cuando el Real Madrid es eliminado en las
competiciones europeas de fútbol? _________
5. ¿Qué porcentaje de la población piensa usted que estaría dispuesta a aceptar un impuesto de 5  euros por
día para los coches que circulen por el centro de Madrid para disminuir el tráfico y la contaminación? _________
6. ¿Qué porcentaje de la población española suele echarse la siesta durante los días laborables? _________
7. ¿Qué porcentaje de los jóvenes españoles ha tomado una consumición en un lugar público sin pagar en los
últimos 6 meses? _________
8. ¿Qué porcentaje de la población española piensa que los impuestos que se pagan en España son excesivos? _________
9. ¿Cuál es el porcentaje de jóvenes españoles que ha tomado más de dos copas de licores fuertes durante una
velada durante el último mes? _________
10. ¿A qué porcentaje de la población española le gusta ver de vez en cuando el programa Gran Hermano? _________
11. ¿Qué porcentaje de la población española piensa usted que ha ido al teatro alguna vez durante el último
año? _________
12. ¿Que porcentaje de la población española piensa usted que ha hecho algún donativo superior a 1 euro a
algún 
mendigo, ONG u organización caritativa desde el principio de año? _________
13. ¿A qué porcentaje de la población le parece justificable engañar a Hacienda (pagar menos impuestos que
lo que se debe) si hay pocas posibilidades de ser descubierto? _________
14. ¿Qué porcentaje de la población cree usted que está a favor de la eliminación del Impuesto de Sucesiones
(no pagar impuestos por las herencias recibidas)? _________
15. ¿Qué porcentaje de la población piensa usted que está a favor de que aumenten mucho los fondos públicos
destinados a la cooperación al desarrollo de los países necesitados? _________29
16. ¿Qué porcentaje de la población española cree usted que piensa que el proceso de globalización
económica es algo positivo? _________
17. ¿Qué porcentaje de la población cree usted que está a favor de que aumente mucho el gasto público
dedicado a la defensa en España? _________
18. ¿Qué porcentaje de la población piensa que habría que disminuir las prestaciones de desempleo para que
los parados busquen trabajo más seriamente? _________
19. ¿Qué porcentaje de la población piensa usted que está favor de que la emigración sahariana y subsahariana
siga llegando como mínimo al mismo ritmo que ahora durante los próximos 10 años? _________
20. ¿Qué porcentaje de la población española piensa usted que está a favor del ingreso de Turquía en la Unión
Europea? _________
3UHJXQWDV&
A continuación, le pedimos que responda a las siguientes preguntas imaginando su reacción en las situaciones
que se describen a continuación. Para cada pregunta le pedimos que establezca su valoración, que podrá tomar
los valores siguientes: 1 en absoluto; 2 poco; 3 indiferente; 4 bastante; 5 mucho.
Cree usted que a la gente en general le sería muy costoso o vergonzoso reconocer públicamente que:
nada mucho
1 2 3 4 5
1. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que se está a favor de que las grandes superficies abran al
público todo el domingo
2. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que se tiene muchas dificultades en aceptar que una hermana
se case con alguien de raza gitana
3. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que uno no ha leído un libro de literatura durante los últimos
tres meses
4. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que uno se alegra cuando el Real Madrid es eliminado en las
competiciones europeas de fútbol
5. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que se está dispuesto a aceptar un impuesto de 5  euros por
día para los coches que circulen por el centro de Madrid para disminuir el tráfico y la contaminación
6. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que suele echarse la siesta durante los días laborables
7. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que ha tomado una consumición en un lugar público sin
pagar 
8. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que piensa que los impuestos que se pagan en España son
excesivos
9. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que ha tomado más de dos copas de licores fuertes durante
una velada durante el último mes30
10. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que a uno le gusta ver de vez en cuando el programa Gran
Hermano
11. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que no ha ido al teatro ninguna vez durante el último año
12. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que no ha hecho ningún donativo superior a 1 euro a algún
mendigo, ONG u organización caritativa desde el principio de año
13. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que le parece justificable engañar a Hacienda (pagar menos
impuestos que lo que se debe) si hay pocas posibilidades de ser descubierto
14. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que está a favor de la eliminación del Impuesto de
Sucesiones (no pagar impuestos por las herencias recibidas)
15. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que está en contra de que aumenten mucho los fondos
públicos destinados a la cooperación al desarrollo de los países necesitados
16. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que piensa que el proceso de globalización económica es
algo positivo
17. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que está a favor de que aumente mucho el gasto público
dedicado a la defensa en España
18. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que piensa que habría que disminuir las prestaciones de
desempleo para que los parados busquen trabajo más seriamente
19. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que está en contra de que la emigración sahariana y
subsahariana siga llegando como mínimo al mismo ritmo que ahora durante los próximos 10 años
20. Sería vergonzoso que se supiera públicamente que está en contra del ingreso de Turquía en la Unión
Europea